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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Appellee,
v..

:

Case No. 960560-CA

:

ADRIAN RUSSELL HICKEY,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

Priority No

2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal fr om a denial of defendant's motion to withdraw
his guilty pleas to robbery, a second degree felony, in violation
of Utah Code Ann § 76-6-301 (1990) ; aggravated assault:, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(1) (1990); and
kidnaping, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-5-301 (1990), in the Seventh Judicial District Court, Carbon
County, the Honorable Bruce K. Halliday presiding.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL and STANDARDS OF REVIEW
!•

Did the trial court:'A erroneous but incidental reliance

on the doctrine of res judicata in denying defendant's motion to
withdraw his 1992 guilty pleas affect the outcome of thin case?
This Court may "affirm the judgment . . . on only one of the
grounds relied on by the trial court." Callister v. Millstream Assoc.,
Inc., 738 P.2d 662, 663 (Utah App. 1987).

2.

Did the trial court reasonably refuse to extend by four

years the 30-day deadline for defendant to withdraw his 1992 guilty
pleas?
An appellate court will reverse a trial courtfs decision on a
motion to withdraw a guilty plea only if "it clearly appears that
the trial court abused its discretion."

State v. Mildenhall. 747

P.2d 422, 424 (Utah 1987).
3.

Did the trial court err by not sua sponte converting

defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas in the criminal action
into a separate/ civil post-conviction petition?
Because defendant failed to preserve this claim by a timely
objection below and does not argue any exception to the preservation
requirement on appeal, this claim is not subject to review under any
standard. See State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995)
(where appellant does not argue that "exceptional circumstances" or
"plain error" justifies review of an unpreserved issue, this Court
will decline to consider it on appeal).
4*

Was the trial court required to hold an evidentiary hearing

on defendant's untimely motion to withdraw his 1992 guilty pleas?
The question of whether an evidentiary hearing is required is
generally within the discretion of the trial court. See, e.g. , Andrews
v. State Board of Pardons. 836 P.2d 790, 794 (Utah 1992) (per curiam)
(commutation of sentence);
P.2d

1252, 1257

Selvage v. J.J. Johnson & Assoc, 910

(Utah App. 1996)

(attorneys fees); Interiors

Contracting, Inc. v. Smith, Halander & Smith Assoc, 881 P.2d 929,
2

931 (Utah App. 1994) (remand for supplemental findings); Kamdar &
Co. v. Larav Co. , Inc. , 815 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah App. 1991) (personal
jurisdiction) .
Accordingly, the appropr i ate standard of review is whether the
trial court abused its discretion.

Under this standard, this Court

will not find an abuse of discretion unless the trial court's
determination was "beyond the limits of reasonabilify."

State v.

Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239-40 (Utah 1992) (citing State v. Ramirez,
817 P2d 774, 781-82 n.3 (Utah 1991)).
5

Is defendant's claim that the court erred in finding him

competent to plead guilty adequately preserved where defendant, at
his 1992 change of plea hearing, stipulated that he was competent
and declined the court's offer of a competency hearing?
"A party who leads a court into error cannot later complain of
that error to obtain reversal."

Clark v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 893

P.2d 598, 600 n.4 (Utah App. 1995) (quoted in State v. Price, 909
P.2d 256, 262 (Utah App. 1995)), cert denied, 916 P.2d 909 (Utah 1996) .
6.

Has defendant preserved his claim, argued for the first

time on appeal, that the 1990 information was direct-filed in violation
of the 1995 case of State v. Mohi?
See standard of review for Issue No

3.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Resolution of this case does not involve the interpretation of
any court rules or statutory provisions.

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Charges. Defendant was charged by Information as follows:
Two counts of aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302(1) (1990);
Five counts of aggravated assault, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(1) (1990);
One count of child kidnaping, a first degree felony, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-301(1) (1990);
One count of theft, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990);
One count of failure to respond to officer's signal to stop,
a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
41-6-13.5 (1990); and
One count of escape, a second degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309(1) (1990)
(R. 3-5, addendum A).
1-2).

Defendant was bound over on all counts (R.

Defendant pled not guilty (R. 18).
Entry of 1990 guilty pleas. On 15 October 1990, defendant pled

guilty and mentally ill to aggravated robbery, aggravated assault,
theft, and escape (R. 30, 32, addendum B) .l

He was committed to the

Utah State Hospital for evaluation (id.).
On 26 October 1990, defendant pled guilty and mentally ill to
the additional charges of aggravated assault, kidnaping (a lesser
included offense of child kidnaping) , and failure to respond (R. 62,
addendum C).

The court ordered a consolidated evaluation (id.).

Defendant was advised of his right to withdraw his guilty pleas within
30 days (id.).
1

R. 32, a minute entry, contains a typographical error:
aggravated robbery (a first degree felony) is misidentified as
aggravated assault (a third degree felony). The error is
corrected in the court's Order for Mental Evaluation (R. 30).
4

Disposition. The State stipulated that defendant was mentally
ill (R. 72) . The Court found that defendant was guilty and mentally
ill, sentenced him to statutory terms to run concurrently, ordered
him to pay restitution of $25, 000, and committed him to the Utah State
Hospital (R. 73-74, 81, addendum D ) .
Withdrawal of 1990 guilty pleas. Sixteen months later, on 5 March
1992, defendant moved to withdraw his guilty pleas on the ground that
they were not voluntarily taken (R. 95, addendum E) . He alleged that
he was not mentally competent at the time of the pleas (R. 98-99) .
The court set aside the guilty pleas, reinstated all charges, and
appointed new counsel to represent defendant (R. 101, 106, addendum
F) . The following day, defendant entered pleas of not guilty by reason
of insanity to all charges (R. 102).
Finding of competence. On 21 April 1992, the court, based on
defendant's plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, ordered the
Department of Human Services to designate professionals to evaluate
defendant's mental condition (R. 103). On 6 July 1992, based on
written mental evaluations and the stipulation of counsel in open
court, the court found defendant mentally competent to proceed (R.
119-20, addendum H ) .
Entry of 1992 guilty pleas. On the same date, defendant pled
guilty to two counts of aggravated assault (third degree felonies)
and one count each of robbery and kidnaping (second degree felonies) ;
the remaining charges were dismissed (R. 118, 121).
Disposition. Defendant was sentenced to concurrent statutory
terms (R. 121-22, addendum I).
5

Motion to vacate sentence. On 5 October 1993 Defendant filed
a pro se motion to vacate his sentence on the ground that the
presentence report "contained erroneous information and Defendant
was not afforded ample opportunity to view and correct said erroneous
information" (R. 123; see also R. 124-28).
The court denied defendant's motion on the ground that "No Presentence Report was ever ordered by the Court and none was ever
prepared and submitted to the Court prior to either of the Defendant' s
Sentencing Hearings" (R. 133-34, 137) .
Motion to vacate judgment and sentence. On 8 August 1995,
defendant filed a pro se Motion to Vacate Judgment and Sentence (no
grounds specified) (R. 142) . On 21 September 1995, defendant filed
a pro se Motion to Submit for Decision on Motion to Vacate Judgment
and Sentence (R. 145). On 27 September 1995, defendant filed a pro
se Motion for Expedited Disposition of Motion to Vacate Judgment and
Sentence (R. 147) and Motion to Submit for Decision on Motion to Vacate
Judgment and Sentence (R. 149) . On the same date defendant sent a
letter to Judge Halliday requesting appointment of counsel and stating
that defendant planned, in his words, "to sue the State of Utah and
everyone who conspired the illegal Prison Sentence I am now serving"
(R. 151) .
Judge Halliday entered an order stating that

ff

[t]he Court has

received pleadings in this case and in two other civil cases involving
Defendant herein. Good cause appearing, the Court consolidated those
civil cases" (R. 154). The court dismissed as untimely defendant's
motion to vacate his sentence and suggested that defendant "pursue
6

the Extraordinary Writ proceeding which raises the same issues as
are raised by the Motion herein" (id.).
Motion to withdraw 1992 guilty pleas. On 17 May 1996, defendant
filed a pro se motion and memorandum seeking to withdraw his 1992
guilty pleas, citing Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6; rule 65B, Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure; and rules 11 and 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure (R.

162-74, addendum J).

hearing (R. 175, addendum K ) .

He also filed a request for

Defendant claimed that he was not

competent at the change of plea hearing because he had not been given
his medications and requested relief from the 30-day time limit for
withdrawal of guilty pleas on the ground that he had not been advised
of it when he entered his plea (R. 164-67).
The State resisted defendant's motion on the ground that it was
untimely under Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2) (1995) (R. 179, addendum
L) . Defendant filed a response (R. 183-84, addendum M) and request
for oral argument (R. 185, addendum N ) .
On 6 June 1996, the court, without oral argument, denied the
motion on the grounds that it was untimely and "to the extent that
the matter has been ruled upon by another Judge that that decision
is res judicata herein" (R. 180-81; see also R. 201, addendum 0 ) .
Defendant timely appealed (R. 198).2

2

No new notice of appeal was required after the denial of
defendant's subsequent motion for reconsideration, since that
motion was untimely (see R. 180, 187, 201). See Utah R. App. P.
4(b); Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Hafen, 723 P.2d 425, 426
n.2 (Utah 1986); Reeves v. Steinfeldt, 915 P.2d 1073, 1075-77
(Utah App. 1996); DeBry v. Fidelity National Title Ins. Co., 828
P.2d 520, 522-23 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied, 857 P.2d 948
(Utah 1993).
7

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following factual summary is taken from the statements of
defendant and his co-defendants in connection with their guilty pleas:
On 4 August 1990, defendant and his co-defendants were being
held in a juvenile detention center in Price, Utah (R. 25). They
forcibly took the keys from the jailer, Alice Olsen, breaking her
arm and several ribs in the process (R. 25, 37, 47, 112) . They also
assaulted four other persons, attempting to inflict serious bodily
injury; one of their victims suffered a stroke (R. 37, 47-48, 55,
112) .
Defendant and companions stole and fled in a car, in the back
seat of which they discovered a small girl; they detained her while
attempting to flee (R. 25, 37, 47, 55, 112). Police pursued them
and signaled with lights and sirens for them to stop, but the
perpetrators tried to outrun the police car; the resulting chase,
involving speeds of 90 miles per hour or more, culminated in a serious
accident (R. 25, 37-38, 47, 55)•
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. Res judicata. The trial courtfs mistaken reliance on res
judicata is harmless, since its primary reliance on the untimeliness
of defendant's motion to withdraw was well taken.
2. Untimely motion. The trial court reasonably exercised its
discretion in denying as untimely defendant's motion to withdraw his
1992 guilty pleas, since (1) defendant had been warned of the 30-day
period in connection with his 1990 plea; (2) defendant's motion was
approximately 1,380 days late; (3) defendant offered no explanation
8

why with reasonable diligence the facts alleged in his motion could
not have been discovered some four years earlier; (4) this was
defendant's second motion in this case to withdraw guilty pleas on
grounds of mental incompetence; and (5) a delay of nearly five years
carried great potential to prejudice the State on retrial.
3. Post-conviction petition. Defendant claims that the trial
court erred in not treating his motion to withdraw as a post-conviction
petition.

Because he never raised this issue before, it is not

preserved. It also lacks merit, since he cites no authority imposing
upon a trial court a duty to convert sua sponte a motion to withdraw
a guilty plea into a separate, civil post-conviction proceeding.
4. Evidentiary hearing. Defendant claims that the trial court
erred by not holding an evidentiary hearing on his motion to withdraw.
Whether to hold an evidentiary hearing lies within the discretion
of the trial L mrt.

The court acted reasonably in not holding an

evidentiary hearing, since defendant's motion was untimely.
5.

Defendant's claimed incompetence.

Defendant claims that

the trial court should have granted his motion to withdraw on the
ground that he was mentally incompetent at the time the pleas were
entered. However, since the court dismissed defendant's motion as
untimely, it did not need to reach the merits of the motion.
In any event, any possible underlying error committed by the
plea court in finding defendant competent or in not holding a
competency hearing was invited by defendant, who at the change of
plea hearing stipulated to his competency and personally declined
the court's invitation to hold a competency hearing.
9

6. Mohi claim. Defendantf s Mohi claim was not preserved below.
He also affirmatively waived it with his unconditional guilty pleas
in the district court.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
SINCE DEFENDANT'S MOTION WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEAS WAS
PROPERLY DENIED AS UNTIMELY, THE COURT'S REFERENCE TO RES
JUDICATA WAS HARMLESS
Defendant claims that, since he had never previously moved to
withdraw his 1992 guilty pleas, any reliance by the trial court on
the doctrine of res judicata in denying his motion was error. Br.
Aplt. at 11-12.
In denying defendant' s motion to withdraw his 1992 guilty pleas,
the trial court wrote:
. . .Mr. Hickey has moved to withdraw his plea. It appears
that he has, on another occasion, moved for such relief
and that the same was denied by Judge Lyle Anderson.
Certainly at this point in time the Court should deny the
Motion for Withdrawal of the plea as being untimely and
to the extent that the matter has been ruled upon by another
Judge that that decision is res judicata herein.
(R. 181) . This passage makes clear that the court's primary ground
for denying defendant's motion was untimeliness. The court relied
upon res judicata secondarily and then only "to the extent that the
matter ha[d] been ruled upon" by another judge.
Defendant's assertion that no other judge had ever previously
ruled on a motion by defendant to withdraw his 1992 guilty pleas,
see Br. Aplt. at 12, is correct. The claims asserted in defendant's

10

motion had not been previously adjudicated.3 See Salt Lake Citizens
Congress v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. . 846 P.2d 1245, 1252 (Utah
1992) ("res judicata bars a second adjudication of the same facts
under the same rule of law").4
Consequently, despite the court's apparent intentions, its order
cannot rest in any degree upon the doctrine of res judicata. This
is not a problem. This Court may "affirm the judgment . . . on only
one of the grounds relied on by the trial court."

Callister v.

Millstream Associates, 738 P. 2d 662 (UtahApp. 1987) . It should affirm
on the ground upon which the trial court correctly placed primary
reliance: that defendant's motion was untimely.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT REASONABLY REFUSED TO EXERCISE ITS
DISCRETION TO EXTEND THE 30-DAY DEADLINE FOR DEFENDANT TO
WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEAS
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion
to withdraw his 1992 guilty pleas as untimely. Br. Aplt. at 12-16.
Defendant argues that he was not advised of the 3 0-day deadline at
the time of these pleas and, accordingly, the deadline may not be
enforced against him.

Br. Aplt. at 13. Defendant "assume[s] for

the sake of this argument" that the court did not consider extending
3

The court's confusion had two possible sources: (1) codefendant Paul Payne's motion to withdraw, which Judge Bunnell
denied as untimely and unmerited (R. 86-89, 92); or (2)
defendant's prior motion to withdraw, based on mental
incompetency, which Judge Boyd Bunnell granted (R. 95-101).
4

Although not res judicata, the principle underlying the
trial court's ruling has merit. A defendant should not be
permitted to enter a guilty plea, set it aside, re-enter the
guilty plea, and have it again set aside on identical grounds, ad
infinitum.
11

the time limit based on the failure to advise him of the deadline.
Br. Aplt. at 14.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2) (b) provides: "A request to withdraw
a plea of guilty or no contest is made by motion and shall be made
within 30 days after the entry of the plea."5

This time limit is

jurisdictional. State v. Price. 837 P.2d 578, 582 (Utah App. 1992).
However, "although the language of section 77-13-6(2)(b) is
unconditional, it is subject to an exception incorporated within Rule
11." Id. Rule 11(e) (7) , Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides
that a court "may not accept the plea until the court has found .
. . the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any
motion to withdraw the plea. " Under rule 11 (f) , " [f ] ailure to advise
the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw
a plea of guilty . . . is not a ground for setting the plea aside,
but may be the ground for extending the time to make a motion under
Section 77-13-6" (emphasis added).
In sum, while there is a jurisdictional 30-day time limit for
filing a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, the court may extend the
time for filing this motion if the defendant was not advised of the
3 0-day limit.

The court is not required to do so.

A provision using the term "may" is permissive and leaves the
matter "to the discretion of the court."

State v. Robertson. 932

P.2d 1219, 1233 (Utah 1997); accord Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d
818, 820 (Utah App. 1992) . A reviewing court "will not find an abuse

5

This provision became effective 24 April 1989, more than a
year before defendant committed the crime at issue here. See
Amendment Notes, Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1990).
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of discretion unless the trial court's determination was fbeyond the
limits of reasonability. '" State v. Doporto, 935 P.2d 484, 496 (Utah
1997) (quoting State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992)).
Thus, it is "up to the trial court to decide whether to allow such
extension." State v. Smith. 812 P.2d 470, 476 (UtahApp. 1991), cert,
denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992).6
The trial court could not reach the merits of defendant's motion
without first determining the issue of timeliness.

For several

reasons, the trial court acted reasonably in exercising its discretion
not to enlarge the 3 0-day period.
First, defendant had previously been advised of the 30-day time
limit. Although he was not advised of it at his 1992 change of plea
hearing, at his 1990 change of plea hearing, he and his co-defendants
"were advised of their right to withdraw their pleas within 3 0 days"
(R. 62) . Therefore, it is arguable that under Price the trial court
actually lacked jurisdiction to enlarge the 30-day period.
Second, this is not a case like Price, where the defendant filed
on the thirty-first day.

See 837 P.2d at 580. Defendant entered

his pl;*a on 6 July 1992 and did not file his motion to withdraw that
plea until 17 May 1996 (see R. 118, 121, 162, 174), missing the 3 0-day
deadline by approximately 1,380 days.

6

A discretionary safety valve in a jurisdictional deadline
is not irrational. This Court has previously noted that
"permissive language" in a rule permitting federal courts to
dismiss stale habeas corpus petitions "provides the federal court
discretion to balance the equities of the particular situation,
encourages a petitioner to act with reasonable diligence and
guarantees necessary safeguards in hardship cases." Currier v.
Holden, 862 P.2d 1357, 1367 (Utah App. 1993) (citing 28 U.S.C.
2254 rule 9).
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Third, defendant did not identify any newly discovered evidence
or theory, but relied on facts as accessible to him in 1992 as in
1996.

Even assuming arguendo the truth of the allegations in his

motion and memorandum, defendant offered no excuse for his four-year
delay. He cited the court's failure to advise him of the 30-day time
limit, alleged that he was not given his medication at the time of
his pleas, and claimed that he "had to be told four (4) years after
his entering of the guilty pleas by the prison contract attorneys
and other inmates to include that petitioner is extremely mentally
ill and has been so since his teen years" (R. 167) . While some of
these facts or allegations may relate to the merits of defendant's
motion, none explains why his 1,380-day delay should be overlooked.
He offered no explanation why these facts could not with reasonable
diligence have been discovered before the passage of four years or
why they excuse his extraordinary untimeliness.
Fourth, this was defendant * s second motion to withdraw his guilty
pleas to these charges, and on the same grounds; after the first was
granted, defendant again pled guilty (R. 94-95, 118, 121, 142).
Fifth, a delay of nearly four years carried great potential to
prejudice the State's case in the event a retrial were necessary.
Cf. State v. Mildenhall. 747 P.2d 422, 424 (Utah 1987) (finding on
the facts of that case that "allowing withdrawal of the plea would
greatly prejudice the State").
Defendant "assume [s] for the sake of this argument that the Judge
did not consider extending" the deadline.

Br. Aplt. at 14. This

assumption is contrary to the settled practice of Utah appellate
courts. In defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Withdraw
14

Guilty Plea, he urged the trial court to extend the 30-day time limit
on the ground that he was not advised of it pursuant to rule 11(e) (7)
(see R. 167) . Our courts "presume that the discretion of the trial
court was properly exercised unless the record clearly shows the
contrary." Braithwaite v. West Valley City Corp. , 921 P.2d 997, 1001
(Utah 1996) (quoting Goddard v. Hickman, 685 P.2d 530, 534-35 (Utah
1984)). The legally required -- and most reasonable -- presumption
is that the trial court considered the papers submitted by the parties
and denied defendant's motion notwithstanding his arguments.
Defendant relies on a tolling statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-36
(1995), as

"persuasive

authority"

for his argument

that his

untimeliness should be excused on account of his mental incapacity.
Br. Aplt. at 15. That provision states:
If a person entitled to bring an action, other than for
the recovery of real property, is at the time the cause
of action accrued, either under the age of majority or
mentally incompetent and without a legal guardian, the time
of the disability is not a part of the time limited for
the commencement of the action.
As defendant acknowledges, this statute by its own terms has no
application to the case at bar, since defendant appeals from the denial
of a motion, not dismissal of a cause of action. Moreover, defendant
does not allege that he was continuously "mentally incompetent and
without a legal guardian" for the entire four years after entry of
his guilty pleas.
The trial court did not act unreasonably in denying defendant' s
motion to withdraw; accordingly, it did not abuse its discretion and
this claim fails.

15

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT WAS UNDER NO DUTY TO CONVERT SUA SPONTE
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEAS IN THE
CRIMINAL ACTION INTO A CIVIL POST-CONVICTION PETITION
Defendant claims that the trial court should have treated
defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea as a post-conviction
petition and thus excused defendant from the 30-day time limit for
filing a motion to withdraw guilty pleas.
A.
11

Br. Aplt. at 17-18.

This claim was not preserved.

[A] contemporaneous objection or some form of

specific

preservation of claims of error must be made a part of the trial court
record before an appellate court will review such claims on appeal."
State v. Winward, 319 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 10 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting
State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah 1989)).

Defendant did

not request that the trial court treat his motion as a post-conviction
petition.

Therefore, the issue was not preserved below.

"However, three exceptions to this general rule are recognized
in Utah."

State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 7 (Utah App. 1996), cert,

denied, 931 P.2d 146 (Utah 1997) . "An appellate court may address
an issue for the first time on appeal if appellant establishes that
the trial court committed !plain error,1 if there are 'exceptional
circumstances,f or in some situations, if a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel is raised on appeal . . . "

id. (citations

omitted).
Defendant does not allege plain error, exceptional circumstances,
or ineffective assistance. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09
(Utah 1993) (setting forth elements of plain error) ; Irwin, 924 P. 2d
16

at 7, 11 (noting that the "exceptional circumstances" exception is
limited to cases involving "rare procedural anomalies") . This omission
is fatal to his claim. Merely briefing an unpreserved issue on appeal
is insufficient to bring an unpreserved issue within one of the
exceptions.

Where an appellant "does not argue that "exceptional

circumstances1 or "plain error1 justifies a review of the issue, [this
Court will] decline to consider it on appeal."

State v. Pledger,

896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995) (citation omitted) . Accord State
v. Jennings, 875 P.2d 566, 570 (UtahApp. 1994) (declining to address
issue where defendant briefed it on appeal, but did not assert either
exceptional circumstances or plain error) (citations omitted).
Because defendant failed to preserve this issue for review, and
failed to argue either plain error or exceptional circumstances, this
Court should not reach the merits of this claim.7
B.

This claim lacks merit.

However, defendants claim lacks merit in any event. Defendant
argues that his Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea and accompanying
memorandum "substantially complied with the requirements of the rule"
governing post-conviction petitions. Br. Aplt. at 16.8 He argues
further that since post-conviction petitions "can be brought at any

7

Nor may an appellant raise in his reply brief an issue
that should have been raised in his opening brief, since doing so
would place appellees in the difficult position "of either
missing the opportunity to brief the . . . issue or having to
construct and then rebut the unbriefed issue." State v. Brown,
853 P.2d 851, 854 n.l (Utah 1992).
8

Effective 1 July 1996 post-conviction petitions are
governed by rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Prior to
that time, they were governed by rule 65B.
17

time while the petitioner continues to be imprisoned," the trial
court's disposition was improper.

Br. Aplt. at 17.

A motion to withdraw a guilty plea and a petition for postconviction relief "are two are separate and distinct procedures."
Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1037 n.8 (Utah 1989).

One procedure

is direct and criminal, the other collateral and civil: "challenge
may be made to a guilty plea either directly or collaterally.

If

it is made directly, it must be in the context of a motion to withdraw
a guilty plea, the denial of which can be appealed.

If it is made

collaterally, no prior motion to withdraw is required." Summers v.
Cook, 759 P.2d 341, 344-45 (Utah App. 1988)

(citations omitted).

The two procedures are frequently distinguished in the context
of a defendant or inmate seeking to vacate his guilty plea. Salazar
v. Warden. 852 P.2d 988, 990 n.3 (Utah 1993) (noting that defendant
filed both a motion to withdraw guilty plea, which was later withdrawn
as untimely, and a "petition for habeas corpus") ; Lancaster v. Cook,
753 P.2d 505, 506 (Utah 1988) (per curiam) (holding motion to withdraw
guilty plea is not a prerequisite to seeking post-conviction relief
attacking the guilty plea) ; York v. Shulsen. 875 P.2d 590, 593 (Utah
App.) (noting that petitioner filed a "petition for writ of habeas
corpus" but did not move to withdraw his guilty plea) , cert, denied,
883 P.2d 135 (Utah 1994).
Defendant has cited no case, and the State is aware of none,
requiring a trial court to convert sua sponte a criminal motion to
withdraw a guilty plea into a separate, civil post-conviction
proceeding.
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Defendant is familiar with these procedures. He previously filed
parallel criminal and civil proceedings in a successful effort to
vacate his first guilty pleas.

When the trial court granted

defendant's 1992 motion to withdraw his 1990 guilty pleas, it dismissed
his proceeding seeking a writ of habeas corpus, Hickey v. Verville,
Civil No. 91-266, "as the matter is now moot" (R. 101) . The court's
ruling on defendant' s motion would not have mooted his petition unless
the two sought the same relief. Therefore, defendant was experienced
in seeking to set aside guilty pleas by parallel tracks.
Despite the fact that he alludes to rule 65B in his motion to
withdraw, defendant chose not to file simultaneous criminal and civil
attacks on his 1992 guilty pleas. Having made that choice, he cannot
charge the trial court with error for honoring it.
Moreover, defendant has made no effort to support his assumption
that a post-conviction petition "can be brought at any time while
the petitioner continues to be imprisoned." Br. Aplt. at 17. While
one judge of this court has adopted this "alternative interpretation"
of the statute of limitations issue, see Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d
1357, 1373 (Utah App. 1993) (Orme, J., concurring in result) , cert,
denied, 870 P.2d 957 (Utah 1994) , it does not represent the majority
view of this Court. Thus, defendant has failed to establish that,
even if the court had sua sponte converted defendant's motion to
withdraw into a post-conviction petition, such a petition would have
been timely.
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POINT IV
BECAUSE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEAS
WAS UNTIMELY, THE COURT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO HOLD AN
EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON ITS MERITS
Defendant claims that the trial court erred by not conducting
an evidentiary hearing on the merits of his motion to withdraw. Br.
Aplt. at 18. "If proven true," he argues, "the fact of appellant's
incompetence at the time the plea was entered would make the acceptance
of the plea constitutionally deficient and would entitle appellant
to withdraw the plea."

Br. Aplt. at 19.

The question of whether an evidentiary hearing is required is
generally within the discretion of the trial court. See, e.g. , Andrews
v. Board of Pardons, 836 P.2d 790, 794 (Utah 1992) (per curiam)
(commutation of sentence) ; Selvage v. J.J. Johnson & Assoc, 910
P.2d

1252, 1257

(Utah App. 1996)

(attorneys fees); Interiors

Contracting, Inc. v. Smith, Halander & Smith Assoc, 881 P.2d 929,
931 (Utah App. 1994) (remand for supplemental findings);

Kamdar &

Co. v. Laray Co., Inc., 815 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah App. 1991) (personal
jurisdiction).
Accordingly, the appropriate standard of review is whether the
trial court abused its discretion.

Under this standard, this Court

will not find an abuse of discretion unless the trial court's
determination was "beyond the limits of reasonability."

State v.

Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239-40 (Utah 1992) (citing State v. Ramirez.
817 P2d 774, 781-82 n.3 (Utah 1991)).
Whether a guilty plea is attacked directly in the context of
a motion to withdraw or collaterally in the context of a post20

conviction proceeding, "an evidentiary hearing must ordinarily be
held unless the record of a prior hearing shows petitioner is clearly
not entitled to relief."

Summers, 759 P.2d at 345.

The case at bar is not "ordinary" because defendants motion
was untimely. Although no Utah case addresses this precise issue,
general procedural principles dictate that where a motion or petition
"is time barred by the . . . statute of limitations," a defendant's
motion may be "properly dismissed without . . .

an evidentiary

hearing." Fredrick v. State. 906 S.W.2d 927, 930 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1993) . This is so here because, even assuming arguendo the truth
of defendant's factual allegations, his motion was untimely.
Since defendant's motion was time-barred, the trial court acted
within the limits of reasonability "by not conducting an evidentiary
hearing."

Br. Aplt. at 18.
POINT V

THE MERITS OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW ARE NOT
PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT BECAUSE DEFENDANT'S MOTION WAS
TIME-BARRED AND BECAUSE ANY ERROR OF THE PLEA COURT WAS
INVITED
Defendant claims that "he was not mentally competent at the time
his pleas were entered and therefore those pleas were not made
knowingly and voluntarily."

Br. Aplt. at 20. He argues that his

evaluators found him competent only so long as he remained on his
medications; that when he pled guilty he was not on his medications;
and that the court committed "clear error" by not confirming that
defendant "was currently in compliance with the explicit contingency"
in the psychological reports.

Br. Aplt. at 21-22.
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Defendant recognizes that the trial court did not reach this
question because it denied his motion as untimely. Br. Aplt. at 22.
This fact is dispositive.
This Court has repeatedly held that a court lacks jurisdiction
to consider the merits of an untimely motion for relief of a civil
judgment and errs in doing so. See Davis v. Grand Co. Service Area,
905 P.2d 888, 896-91 (UtahApp. 1995); In re Baby Boy Doe, 894 P.2d
1285, 1287 (UtahApp. 1995); Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons Co.
Inc. , 817 P.2d 382, 387 (UtahApp. 1991). Similarly, having determined
that defendant's motion to withdraw was untimely, the trial court
properly declined to adjudicate its merits, which were then moot.
In any event, any possible underlying error committed by the
plea court in finding defendant competent or in not holding a
competency hearing pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-6 (Supp. 1992) ,
see Br. Aplt. at 21, was invited by defendant, as shown in the
following colloquy from the change of plea hearing:
THE COURT: So, what's your pleasure? Do we set this
matter for hearing, or are you willing to just stipulate
to those reports in [sic] as the record relative to his
competency?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Just a moment, Your Honor.
(Off-record conversation.)
[DEFENSE COUNSEL] : We would stipulate that [defendant]
is competent at this point, Your Honor, and we are prepared
to proceed.
THE COURT: And you don!t wish a hearing where we have
[the doctors] come down and -- You could have a hearing
where we'd have them come down and testify relative to their
findings and so on. Do you wish that to take place?
DEFENDANT: No.
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THE COURT: You don't think that's necessary at this
time?
DEFENDANT: No.
THE COURT: I see. Well, the Court, based upon those,
will find that he is competent to proceed; that he
understands the nature of these proceedings, and he is not
only factually able to proceed and to assist counsel, but
is also rationally able to do so.
(R. 235-37, addendum G) . "A party who leads a court into error cannot
later complain of that error to obtain reversal." Clark v. Farmers
Ins. Exch. . 893 P.2d 598, 600 n.4 (Utah App. 1995) (quoted in State
v. Price. 909 P.2d 256, 262 (Utah App. 1995).
Even on the merits, the trial court acted properly. "Due process
requires a court to sua sponte determine competency before taking
a guilty plea when there is substantial evidence of incompetence such
that a reasonable judge would have a bona fide doubt as to the
defendant's competence." York v. Shulsen. 875 P.2d 590, 594 (Utah
Ct. App.), cert, denied, 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994).

Here, if the

mental evaluations left any lingering doubt as to defendant's
competency, defense counsel's assurance that defendant was competent
(and so apparently taking all necessary medications) removed it.
Under these circumstances, no reasonable judge would have entertained
a bona fide doubt as to defendant's competency.
Having stipulated that he was competent and having declined the
court's offer of a hearing, defendant cannot now premise his claim
of error on these issues.
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POINT VI
DEFENDANT'S 1992 GUILTY PLEAS IN DISTRICT COURT PRECLUDE
HIS CLAIM THAT HIS CASE WAS DIRECT-FILED IN VIOLATION OF
THE 1995 CASE OF STATE V, MOHI
In reliance upon State v. Mohi. 901 P.2d 991 (Utah 1995),
defendant

claims that

the trial

court

in 1992 violated his

constitutional rights by exerting jurisdiction over him, since he
was a juvenile at the time of the commission of the crimes and his
case was filed directly in the district court.
This claim is not preserved.

Br. Aplt. at 22.

Defendant's appeal is from the

denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas (R. 198) . Neither
that motion nor its supporting memorandum mentioned this claim (see
R. 162-67) . Nor did defendant assert this claim in any of his three
change of plea hearings or at any other time in this litigation prior
to his appellate brief.

Defendant "did not present this argument

to the trial court, and therefore the issue was not preserved for
appeal." Macris & Associates, Inc. v. Images & Attitudes.-Inc. , 319
Utah Adv. Rep. 33, 35 (Utah App. 1997) (citing In re Estate of
Morrison, 933 P.2d 1015, 1017 (Utah App. 1997)).
Defendant argues that he "raised this issue before the court
in a separate civil action," which is currently stayed. Br. Aplt.
at 4. Defendant cites no authority, and the State is aware of none,
for the theory that a litigant can preserve an issue for appeal in
one action by asserting it in another.
In addition to failing to preserve this issue, defendant
affirmatively waived it by pleading guilty in the district court.
A voluntary guilty plea in district court waives all non- jurisdictional
24

claims of error, including constitutional error, in the juvenile court.
State in re E.G.T. . 808 P.2d 138, 139 (Utah App. 1991) (per curiam) .
However, "jurisdiction" in this context refers to subject matter
jurisdiction, not personal jurisdiction.

"[D]efects in personal

jurisdiction can be waived"; it is only subject matter jurisdiction,
which "goes to the very power of a court to entertain an action,"
that "cannot be stipulated around nor cured by a waiver."

Curtis

v. Curtis. 789 P.2d 717, 726 (Utah App. 1990) (citing 5 C. Wright
& A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1350 (1969)).
Nothing prevents the waiver of a Mohi claim. Mohi error is not
jurisdictional: Mohi does not speak in jurisdictional terms, nor does
its analysis implicate the "very power of a [district] court to
entertain an action" against a juvenile accused of violent felonies.
Mohi addresses only the means by which a juvenile is brought before
the district

court.

Therefore, even

if Mohi

did

entail a

jurisdictional issue, it must necessarily be one of personal, not
subject matter, jurisdiction.

Consequently, a Mohi claim may be

waived.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's conviction and sentence should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY submitted on

&

September 1997.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General
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Addendum A

efVENTM ClSTRiC i CO'JRI
""CArtOHCDUNlY.UlAK
IN THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT COURT O F C^ffiON COUNTY
STATE OF U T / t f j ^ | ?
m

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

/?}*!*«

£»Si>4,YI ti'*l**f ?%3

TINO RUEBEN ARCHULETA
DOBt 3/16/73

i)EPUTY

INFORMATION

309-8-90

Criminal No. 9c i cr>r> P.fV- FS

AILI KELNA MILLER
DOB: 5/29/74

Criminal No. 9t / fctrfS

-PS

Criminal No. 9c/rt>rfi$£- - FS

PAUL RICHARD PAYNE
DOB: 11/2/73

Defendant(s).

COMES NOW, the undersigned Carbon County Attorney, or Deputy Carbon County
Attorney, and under oath states that he has rea*:n to believe that the abovenamed defendant(s) committed the following crime;s):
DATE:

On or about August 4, 1990

PLACE:

Carbon County, State of Utah

COUNT I: AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, a First Degree Felony, in violation of Section
76-6-302 (1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, in that the said
defendant, at the time and place aforesaid, did unlawfully and intentionally
take personal property in the possession of another from his person or
immediate presence, against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear,
and in the course of committing the above-mentioned robbery, the defendant used
a dangerous weapon or caused serious bodily injury upon another, the victim
being ALICE OLSON?
COUNT H i AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, a First Degree Felony, in violation of Section
/76-6-302 (1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, in that the said
Defendant, at the time and place aforesaid, did unlawfully and intentionally
( w e personal property in the possession of another from his person or
nijtaiediate presence, against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear,
J> ;&nd in the course of committing the above-mentioned robbery, the defendant used
dangerous weapon or caused serious bodily injury upon another, the victim
• tv/a
$
being MELVIN HEIL;

V

COUNT Hit AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a Third Degree Felony, in violation of Section
76-5-103 (1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, in that the said
defendant, at the time and place aforesaid, did intentionally commit an act,
with unlawful force or violence, that caused serious bodily injury to ALICE
OLSON, or did use a dangerous weapon or other means likely to produce death or
serious bodily injury while attempting to do bodily injury to said person;

INFORMATION
209-8-9C
PAGE 2

COUNT IV; AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a Third Degree Felony, in violation of Section
76-5-103 (1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, in that the said
defendant, at the time and place aforesaid, did intentionally commit an act,
with unlawful force or violence, that caused serious bodily injury to MELVIN
HEIL, or did use a dangerous weapon or other means likely to produce death or
serious bodily injury while attempting to do bodily injury to said person;
COUNT V: CHILD KIDNAPPING, a First Degree Felony, in violation of Section 765-301.1 (1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, in that the said defendant,
at the time and place aforesaid, intentionally or knowingly without authority
of law and against the will of the victim, seized, confined, detained, or
transported a child under the age of fourteen (14) years with the intent to
keep or conceal said child from his parents or any other person having legal
custody of said child, the victim having the initials of J.S.j
COUNT VI: THEFT, a Second Degree Felony, in violation of Section 76-6-404,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, in that the said defendant, at the time
and place aforesaid, did obtain or exercise unauthorized control over the
property of another, with a purpose to deprive the owner thereof, to-wit: an
operable motor vehicle belonging to NANETTE SMITH;
COUNT VIIi FAILURE TO RESPOND TO OFFICER'S SIGNAL TO STOP, a Third Degree
Felony, in violation of Section 41-6-13.5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended, in that the said defendant, at the time and place aforesaid, while the
driver of a motor vehicle, having received a visual or audible signal from a
police officer to bring his vehicle to a stop, operated his vehicle in a
willful or wanton disregard of such signal so as to interfere with or endanger
another vehicle or person, or who did attempt to flee or elude a peace officer
by vehicle, and while so doing traveled in excess of 30 miles per hour above
the posted speed limit or caused damage to the property of another or bodily
injury to another;
COUNT VIII: AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a Third Degree Felony, in violation of Section
76-5-103 (1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, in that the said
defendant, at the time and place aforesaid, attempted with unlawful force or
violence to do bodily injury to DENNIS CHRISTENSEN, and in so doing used a
dangerous weapon or other means or force likely to produce death or serious
bodily injury;
COUNT IXt AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a Third Degree Felony, in violation of Section
76-5-103 (1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, in that the said
defendant, at the time and place aforesaid, attempted with unlawful force or
violence to do bodily injury to SHAYNE TERRY, and in so doing used a dangerous
weapon or other means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily
injury;

INFORMATION
309-8-90
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COUNT X; AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a Third Degree Felony, in violation of Section
76-5-103 (1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, in that the said
defendant, at the time and place aforesaid, attempted with unlawful force or
violence to do bodily injury to SCOTT ROBERTSON, and in so doing used a
dangerous weapon or other means or force likely to produce death or serious
bodily injury;
COUNT XI: ESCAPE, a Second Degree Felony, in violation of Section 76-8-309
(1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, in that the said defendant, at the
time and place aforesaid, escaped from official custody in an institution for
confinement of juvenile offenders and employed force, threat, or a deadly
weapon against a person to effect said escape;
contrary to the provisions of the aforesaid statute, and against the peace arid
dignity of the State of Utah.
THIS INFORMATION is based on evidence obtained from the following
witnesses: Scott Henrie, Roy Robinson, Dennis Christensen, Shayne Terry arid
Scott Robertson/900800015 & 19 & 38/099000605/901274^126^

GENE STRATE
Carbon County .Attorney
Subscribed and sworn to before me on this

GS/8/7/90

/

day of August, 1990.

w

•RYNER, Circuit Jud

Addendum B

SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF CARBON, STATE OF UTAH
BOYD BUNNELL, JUDGE

Date:

JOHN GREENIG, COURT REPORTER

Case No.:

STATE OF UTAH, Plaintiff

October 15, 1990
Criminal No-

9:30 a.m.

90-41

Gene Strate

vs
ADRIEN RUSSELL HICKEY, Defendant

Allen S Thorpe

KIFUTP ENTRY
Proceeding before the Court:

CHANGE OF PLEA

The Court was advised that the defendant wished to plead to some of
the charges against him. To Count I, AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a first degree
felony, the defendant entered a plea of guilty and mentally ill. To
Count III, AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a third degree felony, the defendant
entered a plea of guilty and mentally ill. To Count VI, THEFT, a second
degree felony, the defendant entered a plea of guilty and mentally ill.
To Count XI, ESCAPE, a second degree felony, the defendant entered a
plea of guilty and mentally ill. Defendant's Statement was submitted to
the Court. Based on statement of defendant, the Court finds that the
defendant is fully aware of his legal and constitutional rights and
having freely and voluntarily waived those rights, and will order said
pleas of guilty be entered.
The Court orders the defendant be committed to the Utah State
Hospital for evaluation and a report to the court. Upon receipt of the
report, the Court will set a hearing to determine his mental illness.
The Court orders the defendant be delivered immediately to the Utah
State Hospital.
BARBARA PROCARIONE, CLERK
BY:

LORENE BRUNDAGE
DEPUTY COURT CLERK

BOYD BUNNELL, DISTRICT JUDGE

Addendum C

SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF CARBON, STATE OF UTAH

Date:

BOYD BUNNELL, JUDGE

Case No.:

JOHN GREENIG, COURT REPORTER

October 26, 1990 - 3:30p.m.
Criminal No. 90-41

Gene Strate

STATE OF UTAH, Plaintiff
vs

Allen S. Thorpe
Keith H. Chiara
Dan C. Keller, for
Michael A. Harrison

ADRIAN RUSSELL HICKEY,
AILI KEONA MILLER, &
PAUL RICHARD PAYNE, Defendants
MINUTE ENTRY
Proceeding before the Court:

CHANGE OF PLEA

Mr. Chiara advised the Court that Defendant Miller was here toda
for change of plea and enter pleas to COUNT I - AGGRAVATED ROBBERY,
1st Degree Felony; COUNT III i IV - AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a 3rd Degre
Felony; COUNT V - lesser included offense of KIDNAPPING, a 2nd Degre
Felony; COUNT VI - THEFT, a 2nd Degree Felony; COUNT VII - FAILURE T
RESPOND TO OFFICER'S SIGNAL TO STOP, a 3rd Degree Felony; and COUNT XI
ESCAPE, a 2nd Degree Felony.
Mr. Keller advised the Court tha
Defendant Payne was also here today for change of plea and enter plea
to COUNT I - AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, a 1st Degree Felony; COUNT IV
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a 3rd Degree Felony; COUNT V - lesser include
offense of KIDNAPPING, a 2nd Degree Felony; COUNT VI - THEFT, a 2n
Degree Felony; COUNT VII - FAILURE TO RESPOND TO OFFICER'S SIGNAL T
STOP, a 3rd Degree Felony; COUNT VIII & IX - AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a 3r
Degree Felony; COUNT X - AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a 3rd Degree Felony; an
COUNT XI - ESCAPE, a 2nd Degree Felony. The State advised the Cour
what the plea negotiations were.
To said counts, Defendants Miller and Payne plead guilty an
defendants' statements were submitted to the Court.
The Court i
satisfied that the defendants are fully aware of their legal an
constitutional rights, and having waived those rights, ordered thei
pleas of guilty be entered. The counts remaining that were not take
care of today are to be dismissed upon motion of the State.
As to sentencing, Mr. Chiara asked that Defendant Miller be sent fo
a 90-day evaluation but upon objection from the State, the Court ordere
this matter referred to the Department of Adult Probation and Parole fo
a presentence report on both of these defendants. Pronouncement o
•i,*A,

•A.*^

i —

S A 4

&*\*»

nAMAHlKAta

^

Mr. Thorpe advised the Court that Defendant Hickey also here foi
change of plea and enter pleas to COUNT IV - AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a 3rc
Degree Felony; COUNT V - lesser included offense of KIDNAPPING, a 2nc
Degree Felony; and COUNT VII - FAILURE TO RESPOND TO OFFICER'S SIGNAL TC
STOP, a 3rd Degree Felony. To said counts, the defendant plead guilt}
and mentally ill and defendant's statement was submitted to the Court,
The Court is satisifed that the defendant is fully aware of his lega:
and constitutional rights, and having waived those rights, ordered th<
pleas of guilty and mentally ill be entered.
As the defendant is presently under evaulation on his previous
pleas, the Court will order the evaulation continued on the othe:
counts. All defendants were advised of their right to withdraw thei:
pleas within 30 days.
BARBARA PROCARIONE, CLERK
BY:

BOYD BUNNELL, DISTRICT JUDGE

BARBARA PROCARIONE
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GEKE STRATE
Carbon County Attorney
Carbon County Courthouse
120 East Main Street
Price, Utah 84501
(801) 637-4700
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

1

J U D G M E M T

vs.
ADRIAN RUSSELL MICKEY,

,

Criminal No. 90-41

Defendant.

The above-named defendant appeared on Monday, December 3, 1990,
together with his attorney of record, ALLEN THORPE, and the defendant having
previously entered his pleas of guilty and mentally ill to the charges of
COUNT Ii

AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, a First Degree Felony; COUCT IIIi

AGGRAVATED

ASSAULT, a Third Dagr** Felony; COUNT IV s AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a Third Degree
Felony; COUNT Vs

KIDNAPPING, a Second Degree Felony; COUNT VIt

Second Degree Felony; COUNT VIIi

THEFT, a

FAILURE TO RESPOND TO AN OFFICER'S SIGNAL TO

STOP, a Third Degree Felony and COUNT XIi

ESCAPE, a Second Degree Felony, and

Count and counsel having received an evaluation report from the Utah State
Hospital, and counsel for the defendant and for the State having stipulated
that the testimony of the examiners from the State Hospital would be that the
defendant is mentally ill and counsel for the defendant having advised the
Court that he had no legal reason to state why judgment should not be
pronounced, and the Court being fully advised in the premises;
THE COURT FINDS that the defendant has a mental illness mid that he
is a danger to himself and others and that it would be appropriate that he be
committed to the Utah State Hospital; and

MICROFILMED

IT IS THE JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE OF THE COURT that the said ADRIAN
RUSSELL HICKEY serve a term on COUNT I of not less that five (5) years and
which may be for life, on COUNT III serve a term of zero (0) to five (5)
years, on COUNT IV serve a term of zero (0) to five (5) years, on COUNT V
serve a term of not less than one (1) nor more than (15) years, on COUNT VI
serve a term of not less than one (1) nor more than (15) years, on COUNT VII
serve a term of zero (0) to five (5) years, and on COUNT XI serve a term of
not less than one (1) nor more than fifteen (15) years, with all of said jail
sentences to run concurrently, and defendant is committed to the Utah State
Hospital under the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review Board;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant pay one third of the
restitution incurred to the victims herein. The Carbon County Attorney shall
file with the Court a notice setting forth the total amount of said
restitution, and counsel for the defendant shall file any objections to said
amount within ten (10) days of receiving a copy of said notice.
DATED this

-* -» day of December, 1990.
BY THE COURTt

BCmTSO»lELLyi)istrict--ff'udae'
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

w

"

I hereby certify that I nailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Judgment, postage prepaid, on this - J

day of December, 1990, tot

Allen Thorpe, Attorney at Law, P. 0. Box 1238, Castle Dale, UT, 84513; Alice
Olson, 211 S. 400 W., Price, UT, 84501; Nannette Smith, 457 S. 300 W., Price,
UT, 84501; Mel Hell, 180 Locust, Helper, UT, 84526.

MADALENE C. WILLIAMS, Secretary

Addendum E
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Adrian Russell Hickey
Attorney Pro Se
P.O. Box 270
Provo, Utah 84603

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
5taie or U t a K
ADRIAN RUSSELL HICKEY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ADRIAN RUSSELL HICKEY,
Defendant.

:
:

MOTION TO WITHDRAW
PLEA OF GUILTY

:
:
:

Criminal No. 90-41

:

The Defendant, Adrian Russell Hickey, by and through himself,Attorney

Pro Se, and pursuant to the Utah Code of Criminal

Procedure 77-13-6 U.C.A. Amended files this Motion to Withdraw his
Guilty plea.
The Defendant wishes to withdraw his plea of guilty and the
court has indicated he should submit a document.

The plea was not

taken voluntarily. The Defendant motions the Court to allow him to
withdraw his Guilty plea and does so in conjunction with the
enclosed Memorandum in support of this Motion.
Respectfully submitted.
DATED this £V

day of February, 1992.

J " ")

C'rt

~

-ir p -
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Adrian Russell Hickey
Attorney Pro Se
P.O. Box 270
Provo, Utah 84603

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION TO WITHDRAW
HIS GUILTY PLEA

ADRIAN RUSSELL HICKEY,
Plaintiff,

Criminal No. 910400597

vs.

Judge Cullen Y. Christensen

ADRIAN RUSSELL HICKEY,
Defendant.

The Defendant , Adrian Russell Hickey, by and through himself,
Attorney Pro Se, and pursuant to the Utah Code of Criminal
Procedure 77-13-6 U.C.A. Amended files this Memorandum of Support
of his Motion to Withdraw his Guilty Plea.

FACTS and ARGUMENT
1*

That the defendant, above-named is presently wrongfully

unconstitutionally

confined,

detained

and

restrained

in

his

personal liberty by the State of Utah under the color of state law
at the Utah State Prison, located at Post Office Box 250, Draper,
Utah 84020.

2.

The reason for this motion is that the plea was not taken

voluntarily which has resulted in unconstitutional confinement,
imprisonment and restraint presently imposed upon the Defendant is
by virtue of the following conviction obtained and entered against
the Defendant

as the result of a plea of guilty before the

Honorable Boyd Bunnell, Judge of the Seventh Judicial District
Court of Carbon County, State of Utah, in criminal case number 9041. Attached hereto is a copy of the Defendant's Judgement in this
case

dated

December

3,

1990

for

the

Honorable

Court's

consideration.
3.

That the Honorable Boyd Bunnell, Judge of the Seventh

Judicial District Court, in and for Carbon County, State of Utah,
erred in his acceptance of the guilty plea entered by the Defendant
in criminal case number 90-41, in counts I, III, IV, V, VI, VII and
XI.

The Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is very specific on

accepting pleas, Rule 11 - Pleas, (5) of the statute, which in the
pertinent part states:
4.

The Court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or no

contest and shall not accept such a plea until the court has made
the findings:
(a)

if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he

has knowingly waived his right to counsel and does not desire
counsel;
(b) the plea is voluntarily made;
(c) the defendant knows he has rights against compulsory
self-incrimination, to a jury trial, and to confront and cross-

2

examine in open court the witnesses against him, and that by
entering the plea he waives all of those rights;
(d) the defendant understands the nature and elements of
the offense to which he is entering the plea; that upon trial the
prosecution would have the burden of proving each of those elements
beyond a reasonable doubt; and that the plea is an admission of all
those elements;
(e) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence
that may be imposed upon him for each offense to which a plea is
entered, including the possibility of the imposition of consecutive
sentences;
(f) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea
discussion and plea agreement, and if no, what agreement has been
reached; and
(g) the defendant has been advised of the time limits
for filing any motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest.
5*

In the case at bar the medical professionals responsible

for his evaluation for competency were in total agreement that the
defendant

was

completely

unable

to

make

a

voluntary

plea,

understand his rights; understand the nature and elements of the
offenses, that the burden was on the prosecution to prove the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt, understand the possible minimum
and maximum sentences, understand the plea discussion and results
of those discussions and understand the time limits to file a
withdrawal of a guilty plea, or appeal (evaluation attached).

3

The record in the instant case at bar, that the petitioner was
evaluated by a physician and psychologist. These medical examiners
state the Petitioner would meet the Listing of Impairments (20 CFR
CH. Ill Part 404 P, App. 1, 12.05) for mental retardation which
would make him qualify for Social Security Disability. This would
imply the defendant is extremely impaired.
The evaluation mental health specialists also indicated that
the defendant was "seriously mentally ill" and likely suffering
from "organic personality disorder of the explosive type.11
The

defendant

was

also

taking

the

following

"Serentil 25 mg. twice a day and 75 mg. at night.

medication

Serentil is an

antipsychotic medication and hopefully will help his delusions and
hallucinations. He also get Inapsine 5 mg. as needed every 8 hours
for agitation, Benadryl 50 mg. as needed for sedation and help the
side effects of the Serentil, and Motrin 800 mg. as needed for
pain."

The evaluation doctors1 concluding opinion is ..." Mr.

Hickey is not competent to proceed.

We believe that his metal

illness or illnesses have seriously compromised his ability to
rationally and factually aid in his won defense and to cooperate
with his lawyer.

Further, it is our opinion that he was not

competent to proceed when he made the plea of guilty and mentally
ill: We would request that his guilty and mentally ill plea be set
aside, that he be found not competent to proceed, and the he be
kept at the Utah State Hospital to see if we will be able to
restore him to such a condition that he would be competent to
proceed."

(See attached of these doctors1 findings).

4

Sincerely Your(s)
Robert J. Howell, Ph.D.
Clinical and Forensic Psychology
Philip Washburn, M.D.
Clinical Director
Forensic Security Unit
Based upon the above information and the Utah State Statute
mandating a certain level of competence in understanding the nature
of the crime, the elements , the burden of proof and my rights at
trial etc., which must be apparent before a plea is accepted. The
Defendant should be allowed to withdraw his Guilty Plea.
Respectfully submitted.
DATED this r$*/

day of February, 1992.
;

&l/u**i fa Wl£

f

Adrian Russell Hickey

<!

5

Addendum F

SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF CARBON, STATE OF UTAH

BOYD BUNNELL, JUDGE

Date:

ELECTRONIC RECORDING

Case No.:

ADRIAN RUSSELL HICKEY, Plaintiff

April 20, 1992 - 1:30 p.m.
Civil No. 91-266
Criminal No. 90-41

Pro Se

vs
BOB VERVILLE, Defendant
(No Present)

David F. Bryant

STATE OF UTAH, Plaintiff

Gene Strate

vs
ADRIAN RUSSELL HICKEY, Defendant

Keith H. Chiara

MINUTE ENTRY
Proceeding before the Court:

HEARING (Writ of Habeas Corpus)

As to the Motion to Set Aside the Plea in Criminal No. 90-41, th<
Court heard statements of counsel and upon being fully advised in th<
premises, now
ORDERS: That it will grant defendant's motion to set aside his ple<
of guilty. Upon motion of the State, the Court will order all elevei
counts be reinstated. There being no objection from defendant, the Courl
will appoint Keith H. Chiara as counsel for defendant.
Defendant it
remanded to the custody of the Carbon County Jail pending dispostion o:
the criminal matter. Bail is set in the amount of $50,000.00. Thij
matter is continued to 11:00 a.m. tomorrow (April 21, 1992) for entry of
plea or motion for a preliminary hearing.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED: That the Motion for Writ of Habeas Corpus ii
Civil No. 91-266 is dismissed as the matter is now moot.
bap
Tape 92-20:

3485

Addendum G

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

TRANSCRIPT OF
SENTENCING

Plaintiff,
vs.
ADRIAN RUSSELL HICKEY,

Judge Boyd Bunnell
Criminal No. CR 90-41

Defendants.

BE IT REMEMBERED that the above-entitled action came
on for sentencing on July 6, 1992, commencing at thv hour
of 9:30 a.m. before the Honorable Boyd Bunnell, District
Court Judge, in the Utah and was electronically recorded.
APPEARANCES
For the Plaintiff:

Gene Strate
Carbon County Attorney
Carbon County Courthouse
Price, Utah 84501

For the Defendant:

Keith B. Chiara
Attorney at Law
P. 0. Box 955
Price, Utah 84501

1

P R O C E E D I N G S

2
3

THE COURT:

4

vs t Afojan RypgeH Hjckey.

5

MR. CHIARA:

6

I

Number 90-41, State of Utah

Your Honor, I represent

—

THE COURT: Let's wait until the Defendant
cones in.

8

I

MR. CHIARA:

9

THE COURT:

All right.
The record may show that the

10

Defendant is present together with his counsel.

II

Court has received the reports from the alienists and

12

doctors who were appointed at the State Hospital to

13

examine him relative to his competency to proceed with

14

trial.

"

Let's see.

The

Mr. Chiara, you received copies of

j those reports, have you?

'* I

MR. CHIARA:

I have, Your Honor.

Your

•' ' Honor, I talked with Mr. Strate just before court began
18

this morning, and we would join with him in requesting

19

that the Court pass this matter to early this afternoon.

20
21
22

THE COURT:
matter until 1:30.

We'll pass this

Is that going to be a convenient

I time?

2*

MR. CHIARA:

24

THE COURT:

25

All right.

Fine.
All right.

We'll pass this

I matter until 1:30 this afternoon.
2

1

(Off the record.)

2
3
4
5

THE COURT: We'll take State of Utah ve.
Adrian Russell Hickev. Criminal No. 90-41. We didn't —
Did we enter an order relative to his competency to
proceed?

6

MR. CEIARA:

7
8
9
10
11

Did we cover that?
We haven't yet.

TEE COURT: Okay. We'll have the record
show that the Defendant and counsel are present and counsel for the State is present. The Court has received the
reports from the Forensic Unit of the Utah State Hospital
relative to the examination that was conducted of Mr.

12

Hickey pursuant to the request of the Court. I have the

13

reports from Dr. Howell and also from Dr. Payne relative

14

to those examinations relative to his competency to

15

proceed.

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
21
24
25

And, Mr. Chiara, you've had access to copies of
those, have you?
MR. CHIARA:

Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So, what's your pleasure? Do
we set this matter for hearing, or are you willing to
just stipulate to those reports in as the record relative
to his competency?
MR. CHIARA:

Just a moment, Your Honor.

(Off-record conversation.)
MR. CHIARA: We would stipulate that he is
3

1

competent at this point, Your Honor, and we are prepared

2

to proceed.

3

THE COURT: All right. The reports indi-

4

cate that in the opinion of the doctors, he is competent

5

to proceed and understands the nature of the proceedings

6

and is able to assist his counsel in the disposition of

7

this matter. And now I indicate he is willing to stipu-

a

late to that fact.

9

MR. CHIARA:

10

direct questions to Mr. Hickey, the Court may.

11

THE COURT:

12
13

If the Court would like to

You understand, Mr. Hickey,

what we're doing here?
I

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

1

THE COURT: You agree that these reports,

I the Court can take those into consideration in making its
16

ruling?

17

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

18

THE COURT: And you don't wish a hearing

19

where we have them come down and —

20

hearing where we'd have them come down and testify rela-

21

tive to their findings and so on.

22

take place?

21
24

You could have a

Do you wish that to

THE DEFENDANT: No.
I
1

THE COURT: You don't think that's necessary at this time?

4

1

THE DEFENDANT: No.

2
3
4
5
6
7
8

THE COURT: I see. Well, the Court, based
upon those, will find that he is competent to proceed;
that he understands the nature of these proceedings, and
he is not only factually able to proceed and to assist
counsel, but is also rationally able to do so.
So, what is the situation then, gentlemen,
relative to the case?

9

MR. STRATE:

We discussed a possible

10

disposition, Your Honor.

II

disposition.

12

We would propose, Your Honor, under what is presently

13

Count I, Aggravated Robbery, Mr. Hickey be allowed to

14

enter a Guilty plea to the included offense of Robbery,

15

which would be a second-degree felony.

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
21
24
25

I believe we arrived at a

This would involve four different counts.

It is also my understanding that he is willing
to enter Guilty pleas to Count III, Aggravated Assault,
which has the victim Alice Olsen; Count IV, Aggravated
Assault, which has the victim Melvin Heil, as presently
set forth; and also Count V, the included offense of
Kidnapping, which is a second-degree felony. Whereupon,
the State would move to dismiss the remaining counts.
That would be two second-degree felonies and two thirddegrees that he would be pleading to.
The State also, as part of plea negotiations,
5

will join in the recommendation that he be sentenced
concurrently on those.

I believe that's what happened

the last time.
THE COURT:

Count III is a third-degree

felony, is it not?
MR. STRATE:

Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Count IV is also a third-

MR. STRATE:

That's correct.

degree felony?
10
11

THE COURT:

Is that correct, Mr. Chiara,

he's willing to do that?

12

MR. CHIARA:

13

THE COURT: All right.

14

MR. STRATE:

Be is, Your Honor.

I believe the other two

15

defendants in this case were sentenced concurrently as

16

well, Your Honor.

17
18
19
20
21
22
21
24
25

THE COURT: I see. Well, Mr, Hickey, why
don't you and your counsel come up right here to the
rostrum, and we'll talk to you a little bit about this.
Your counsel, Mr. Hickey, has handed me what is
entitled "Statement of Defendant" which you have signed,
which explains to you some of your legal and constitutional rights and explains to you that if I accept your
pleas of Guilty on those counts as indicated, that you
would be giving up those rights. You understand that, do
6

you?
TEE DEFENDANT: Yes.
TEE COURT:

You went over this statement

with your counsel?
TEE DEFENDANT: Yes.
TEE COURT:

Is there any of those para-

graphs that you didn't understand or you understood them
all when you went through them with him?
TEE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Be explained them to you, did
he?
THE DEFENDANT:
TEE COURT:

Right.

I still have to make certain

on the record, Mr. Eickey, that you understand what some
of your rights are that you are waiving. One is that you
would be entitled to a trial by jury, if you care to have
one.

Do you understand you have that right?
TEE DEFENDANT:

Right.

TEE COURT: You further understand that if
a trial were held, you could either testify, or you could
choose not to testify. And, if you chose not to testify
at trial, that fact could not be held against you in any
way. You understand you have that right not to testify?
TEE DEFENDANT:

Right.

TEE COURT: You further understand that if
7

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

a trial were held, you and your attorney would have a
right to be present, to examine all witnesses that were
presented against you, and you'd have the right to subpoena witnesses in your own behalf; you understand that?
TEE DEFENDANT:

Right.

THE COURT: Do you further understand that
if a trial were held and you were convicted, you would
have a right of appeal to an appellate court? If for any
legal reason you felt the trial was not fairly conducted
or you disagreed with some of the rulings of the court,
you would have a right of appeal. Do you understand that?

12

THE DEFENDANT;

13

TEE COURT: And do you understand that if

14

I accept your pleas of Guilty as to these charges, you

15

would be giving up those rights — you'd be waiving them.

16

Do you understand?

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

TEE DEFENDANT:

Right.

Right.

TEE COURT: And that's what you're doing,
if I accept your plea. You understand that?
TEE DEFENDANT:
TEE COURT:

Yea.

Now, Mr. Eickey, if a trial

were held, the State would have to prove what we call the
elements of each of these offenses. For instance, under
— Well, first of all, I guess I better get your plea on
these before we proceed any further. I should have done
8

1

that.

2

Let me ask you then, Mr. Hickey, to the lesser-

3

included offense under Count I of —

4

lesser-included

offense

of Robbery

It would be the
alleged

to have

5

occurred on or about August 4th of 1990, this being a

6

second-degree felony involving the taking of some pro-

7

perty from Alice Olsen, what is your plea: guilty or not

8

guilty?

9

TEE DEFENDANT:

Guilty.

10

THE COURT: And to Count III, Aggravated

11

Assault, this being a third-degree felony alleged to have

•* I occurred on or about that same date involving the victim
1
14

'

of Alice Olsen, what is your plea: guilty or not guilty?
THE DEFENDANT:

Guilty.

15

THE COURT: And as to Count IV, Aggravated

16

Assault, a third-degree felony alleged to have occurred

17

on or about that same date involving Melvin Beil, H-e-i-

18
19
20
21
22
21
24
25

1, what is your plea on that charge?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Guilty.

And to the lesser-included

offense of Kidnapping under Count V, which would be a
second-degree felony involving the kidnapping of a person
whose initials are J.S. alleged to have occurred on or
about that same date, what is your plea to that count?
THE DEFENDANT:

Guilty.
9

THE COURT: All right. Now, before I can
accept those pleas, Mr. Hickey, I have to make sure you
are aware of the rights we were just talking about. And
if I were to re-ask you those questions, your answers
would be the same, would they?
THE DEFENDANT:

Right.

THE COURT: Now, Mr. Hickey, if we tried
this case, the State would have the burden of proving
beyond a reasonable doubt what we call the elements of
the offense. Under Count I they would have to prove that
you took personal property from Alice Olsen or from her
immediate presence by the use of either force or fear and
that you intended to deprive her of that property.

The

State would have to prove that beyond a reasonable doubt.
If I accept your plea to that count, you're telling me
that you actually did it, you see?

You're admitting to

those factual elements. Do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Right.

Right.

And under Count III, if we

were to try it, the State would have to prove that you
did assault Alice Olsen and that you used either a
dangerous weapon or other means likely to produce death
or serious bodily injury while attempting to do bodily
injury to her.

And, if I accept your plea of Guilty,

you're also admitting to those elements. You understand
10

1

that?

2

THE DEFENDANT:

I
4

Right.

THE COURT: And under Count IV, Aggravated
Assault, as applies to Melvin Heil, the State would still

5

have the burden of proving the elements of that offense,

6

too; that is, you intentionally and unlawfully caused

7

serious bodily injury to Mr. Heil and that you did it

•

with use of a dangerous weapon or other means likely to
produce death or serious bodily injury. And, if I accept

10

your plea of Guilty to that count, you're also telling me

1!

that factually you did that.

12

THE DEFENDANT:

13
14
15
16
IT
18
19
20
21
22
21
24
25

Do you understand?

THE COURT:

Right.

And Count V, the lesser-

included offense of kidnapping, the State would have to
prove that you seized this person illegally and intentionally; that you transported him with the intent to
either conceal or to deprive the legal custodian of the
person.

And the State would have to prove that also.

And, if I accept your plea of Guilty to that count,
you're also admitting factually that you did that.

Do

you understand?
THE DEFENDANT:

Right.

THE COURT: Now, Mr. Bickey, the maximum
sentence that I can impose under Count I, if I accept
your plea, is a term of not less than one nor more than
11

1

fifteen years in the Utah State Prison or a fine or both.

2

Under Count III, the maximum sentence that I can impose

3

would be a term not to exceed five years in the Utah

4

State Prison or a fine or both. Under Count IV, the maxi-

5

mum term would be a term not to exceed five years or a

6

fine or both.

7

And under Count V, the maximum term I

could impose would be a term of not less than one nor

8

more than fifteen years or a fine or both. And you under-

9

stand that whatever sentence is imposed is entirely up to

10

me; is that correct?

Do you understand that?

11

TBE DEFENDANT:

12

THE COURT:

Yea, I do.
Of course, there is the

I possibility that we could make those sentences run either
1

concurrently or consecutively, and the counsel have

15 ' already stated their recommendations to me, and I don't
16
see that I have any reason not to follow that recommenda17 tion. But you understand I'm not legally bound to do so?
18

TBE DEFENDANT:

19

THE COURT: I can deviate from that, if I

20

decide to?

21

THE DEFENDANT:

22
21

Right.

Right.

THE COURT: You understand that?
|

THE DEFENDANT:

Right.

1

THE COURT: Are you entering this of your
own free will, Mr. Hickey, other than the fact that the

12

State has agreed to allow the entry of the plea as indicated to the lesser offenses and to dismiss the balance
of the Information and to make the recommendation it did
relative to sentencing? Other than that, has anyone made
you any promises or any inducements to get you to enter
this plea?
THE DEFENDANT: No.
THE COURT:

So you are doing it of your

own free will then?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Right.

The Court finds that the

Defendant is aware of what his legal and constitutional
rights are and that he is freely and voluntarily waiving
those. And we'll order, then, that the pleas of Guilty
to those counts be entered and, upon motion of the State,
will order that the balance of the counts in the Information be dismissed.
Do you wish sentencing to take place at this
time, Mr. Chiara?

The law provides that you can —

I

can't impose sentence less than two days nor more than
thirty from this date, but you can waive that and be
sentenced now, if you wish to do so.
THE DEFENDANT:

I'd like to be sentenced

now.
THE COURT:

You'd like to be sentenced
13

1

now?

2

THE DEFENDANT:

Yea.

3
THE COURT:

All right.

The Court has

4
already heard the recommendation of the State, so the
5
6
7
•

9
10
11

Court will order that the Defendant be imprisoned in the
Utah State Prison for a term of not less than one nor
more than fifteen years under Count I, for a term of not
to exceed five years under Count III, for a term of not
to exceed five years under Count IV, and a term of not
less than one nor more than fifteen years under Count V.
And, since this all arose out of a common criminal

12

episode, the Court will order that the sentences run

13

concurrently —

14

ordered committed to the warden of the Utah State Prison

15

17

19

And he is

for the imposition of that sentence.

16

18

together, at the same time.

MR. CHIARA:

Thank you, Your Bonor.

TEE COURT:

Court is in recess at this

time.
(Sentencing concluded.)

20
21
22
23
24
25

14

1

CERTIFICATE

2
3
4
5

' STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF EMERY

)
)

€
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

I, Teresa Manzanares, do hereby certify that I am a
Notary Public in and for the State of Utah;
That

sentencing

the

above

matter

was

electronically record and said electronic recording was
caused by me to be transcribed into typewriting; and the
foregoing pages numbered 2 to 14 constitute a full, true
and correct report of the same.
DATED this 4th day of November, 1993.
-)

15
16

Teresa Manzanares J
Notary Public
'
Residing at Ferron, Utah

17

'*

in

My Commission Expires:
I i ^ ^ t v TERESA KlANTAu^ZT

"

March 1, 1997

liGfo^Xd1*^'
_g>MM.EXP,3.i.S7
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Addendum H

J:L-S 92
SEVENTH DISTRICT C0U7.T
STATE CF UTAH
GENE STRATE #3137
Carbon County Attorney
Carbon County Courthouse
120 East Main Street
Price, Utah 84501
(801) 637-4700
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

vs.

I

ADRIAN RUSSELL HICKEY,

(

Defendant.

ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S
MENTAL COMPETENCY
Criminal No. 90-41

'

The above-named defendant appeared on July 6, 1992, together with his
attorney, KEITH H. CHIARA, and the Court and counsel for the defendant anc for
the State having received written reports of mental evaluations performed at
the Utah State Hospital, the agency designated by the Department of Human
Services to evaluate the defendant's mental condition; and counsel for the
defendant and for the State having stipulated in open court that the written
evaluations of ROBERT J. HOWELL, PhD, and J. ANTHONY GILLETT, MD & MPH, be
considered by the Court without formal testimony from said examiners or other
witnesses; and the Court having duly reviewed said evaluations;
The Court finds that the defendant, ADRIAN RUSSELL HICKEY, is fully
aware of the nature of the charges against him and the possible penalties for
those charges; that he is able to assist counsel in his defense and to
discuss possible plea negotiations with said counsel; and that he is
rationally and factually able to comprehend the proceedings in this case; and
based on these findings,

IT IS ORDERED that^the defendant is mentally competent to proceed.
DATED this

^ d a v of July, 1992.
BY THE

momzf, Judged
CERTIFICATE" OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Order on Defendant's Mental Competency, postage prepaid, on this
c

day of July, 1992, to« Keith H. Chiara, Attorney at Law, P. 0. Box

955, 37 East Main, Price, UT 84501.

<??MAZ//WJ,*.,
MADALENE C. WILLIAMS, Secretary
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SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
STATE C-F UTAH
GENE STRATE #3137
Carbon County Attorney
Carbon County Courthouse
120 East Main Street
Price, Utah 84501
(801) 637-4700
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

vs.

I
1

JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT
TO STATE PRISON

ADRIAN RUSSELL HICKEY,

i

Criminal No. 90-41

Plaintiff,

Defendant.

The above-named defendant appeared on Monday, July 6, 1992, together
with his attorney of record, KEITH H. CHIARA, for sentencing, and having
previously entered his plea of guilty to the charge of COUNT I: ROBBERY, a
Second Degree Felony; COUNT III: AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a Third Degree Felony;
COUNT IV* AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a Third Degree Felony; COUNT V: KIDNAPPING, a
Second Degree Felony; and having advised the Court that he had no legal reason
to state why judgment should not be pronounced, and the Court being fully
advised in the premises;
IT IS THE JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE OF THE COURT that the said ADRIAN
RUSSELL HICKEY serve a term in the Utah State Prison of one (1) to fifteen
(15) years on Count I; zero (0) to five (5) years on Count III; zero (0) to
five (5) years on Count IV; and one (1) to fifteen (IS) years on Count V with
all prison terms to run concurrently with credit given for 732 days already
served.

You, the said ADRIAN RUSSELL HICKEY, are hereby rendered into the
custody of the Sheriff of Carbon County, State of Utah, to be by him delivered
into the custody of the Warden, or other proper officer of said State Prison.
DATED this g

day of July, 1992.
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June 23, 1992

The Honorable Judge Boyd Bunnell
Judge. Seventh Judicial District Court
for Carbon County
Carbon County Court Complex
149 East 100 South
Price, Utah 84051
Re: Adrian Russell Hlckey
Criminal No. 90-41
Dear Judge Bunnell:
Dr. Payne 1s out of town for sometime. I have therefore examined the above
defendant and providing the following report.
BACKSEOUNn TNPORMATTON:

This 1s a 19 year old single Caucasian male who comes from a very
dysfunctional family 1n which the parents and all nine children used street
drugs and alcohol to excess. This patient started smoking marijuana at age
11. He Increased It until he used 1t dally. He has a history of cocaine use
at 13. He overdosed on LSD at 14 and has continued to use crank and crack and
continued to have some flashbacks up to the date of his original admission.
The patient was originally admitted to Utah State Hospital on October 16. 199C
and discharged January 31, 1992. He was referred by the PSRB to the Board of
Pardons who placed him back 1n prison. He was then readmitted on the Hay 26,
1992 for a 30 day evaluation.
The patient has a long history of delinquent criminal and mentally 111
behavior. He has been admitted Into state hospitals 1n Georgia, Kentucky, am
Colorado and has been on psychiatric medication on and off for a considerable
time.
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Page 2
PAST DIAGNOSIS:
Axis I 310.10 Organic Personality Disorder (explosive type)
Axis II 304.90 Polysubstance dependency NOS
301.70 Antisocial Personality 01 sorder
Axis III '
Borderline Intellect
Full scale 10 1s 64 - 85, which places M m 1n the mild mentally defective to
borderline Intellect. He also has a history of Attention Deficit Disorder and
learning disorder is a child which probably was not treated at that time.
On admission to Utah State Hospital on Hay 26. 1992, the patient stated that
he had no particular complaints. He was "asking for an appeal of his
sentence. I think, the case can be overturned and I will go free." He also
stated that time that he was subject to "blackouts," 1n which he stated he
starts to sweat and get nervous and does not remember what happens.- However,
his account of these attacks does not correspond to anything pathological and
if they in fact occur, they are probably hysterical dissociations.
The patient was dressed appropriately. He was quiet and cooperative. He had
a flat affect and stated that sometimes he heard what he described as
"voices," but stated that were "roaring noises like a tiger" and at times he
claimed to see "green demons." He has attempted suicide in the past
approximately three times, but denied any thoughts of suicide at this time.
He showed poor judgment. He was oriented and his memory, both recent and
remote, appear to be Intact.
TREATMENT: The patient was placed on Tegretol 200 mgs twice a day, on
Sorentll 300 mgs each night, Prozac 40 mgs each morning, Ativan 1 mg 3 times a
day, and Trazodone 150 mgs at night for sleep. The Tegretol was later
Increased to 400 mgs twice a day.
On this regime, he has done very well. He has three times been 1n seclusion
for aggressive behavior, but apart from that, has shown relatively normal
behavior.
COMPETENCY: The patient 1s fully aware of the charges against M m and the
nature of those charges being felonies. He 1s aware the possible sentences
and can discuss the possible plea bargains that he might make. He understands
the roles of the court officers, the prosecuting attorney, the judge, and his
defense attorney, who X think he 1s able to assist 1n his own defense, and to
discuss the circumstances of the crime and possible pleas.
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It 1s my opinion that this patient 1s now competent to proceed to trial 1n
accordance with Sections 71-15-1 of the Utah Code and that he will remain so
as long as he stays on his present Dedications on a long tern basis 1n
whatever environment he nay be.
If I can give you any further Information, please let me know.
Sincerely, ^ ^ 7
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3. AnthonyGinett.IlD, MPH
Rrt Cert.
f « r + _ Am.
Am firf.
Ptwph. Neuro.
lift
Bd.
Bd. Psych.
Clinical Director

3AG:skh
cc: Keith CMara, Defense Attorney
37 East Main Street
Price, Utah 84501
Gene E. Strate, Carbon County Attorney
County Office Building
120 East Main Street
Price, Utah B4501
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SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF UTAH
6ENE STRATE #3137
Carbon County Attorney
Carbon County Courthouse
120 Cast Main Street
Price, Utah 84501
(801) 637-4700
ZM THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

1

JUDGMENT AKD COMMITMENT
90 STATE PRISON

i

Crlalnal Mo. 80-41

vs.
ADRIAN RUSSELL HICKEY,
Defendant.

The above-nased defendant appeared on Monday, July €, 1992, together
with hit attorney of record, KEITH H. CKIARA, for sentencing, and having
previously entered his plea of guilty to the charge of COUNT It ROBBERY, a
Second Degree Felony; COUNT H i t AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a Third Degree Felony;
COUNT IVi AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a Third Decree Felony; COUNT Vt KIDNAPPING, a

Second Degree Felony; and having advised tai tourt that he had no legal reason
to state why Judgment should not be pronounced, and the Court being fully
advised in the premises;
XT IS THE JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE OF THE COURT that the said ADRIAN
RUSSELL HICKEY serve a t e n in the Utah State Prison of one (1) to fifteen
(15) years on Count I; sero (0) to five (5) years on Count Z H ; sero (0) to
five (5) years on Count XV; and one (1) to fifteen (15) years on Count V with
all prison t a n s to run concurrtntly with credit given for 732 days already
served.

Tou, the said ADRIAN KUSSELL KXCXEY, «x« hereby rendered into the
custody of the Sheriff of Carbon County, State of Utah, to be by hia delivered
into the custody of the Warden, or other proper officer of said State Prison.
HAJED this ^
day of July, 1P92.
BTfKB
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Addendum L
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GENE STRATE #3137
Carbon County Attorney
120 East Main Street
Price, Utah 84501
(801) 636-3240
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
vs.

OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY
PLEA(S)

ADRIAN RUSSELL HICKEY,

Criminal No. 90-41

Plaintiff,

Defendant.
COMES NOW the State of Utah, by and through the Carbon
County Attorney, and objects to Defendant's Motion to Withdraw
Guilty Plea(s) which was dated May 12, 1996. The State moves theCourt to deny saia Motion on the grounds that it is most
untimely. The defendant entered his guilty pleas on July 6,
1992, and UCA Section 77-13-6(2)(b) requires that a request to
withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest shall be made within
thirty days (30) aftfr entry of the plea.
DATED this S ^
day of June, 1996.

GE"NE" STRATE
Carbon County Attorney
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing OBECTION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY
PLEA(S), postage prepaid, on this S
day of June, 1996, to:
Adrian Hickey #21184, U-2 1-01, PO Box 250, Draper, UT 84020.

QTUMUI Wiih^

MADALENE C. WILLIAMS Secretary
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ADRIAN HXCKEY,

ORDER
Petitioner,

vs.
BOARD OF PARDONS, et al.,
Respondents.

Case No. 950700359

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ADRIAN HXCKEY,
Defendant.

Case No. 90-41

The Plaintiff having filed on Kay 17, 1996 a Motion for
Preparation of Transcripts and Administrative Records together with
a Motion for Appointment of Counsel in Case No. 950700359, and the
Court having reviewed the file and finding a Motion for Stay of
Proceedings filed by the Defendant herein upon which no action has
been taken, the sane having been filed on April 8, 1996, the Court
now concludes that an Order staying the proceedings should be
entered herein.

Based upon the Stay Order the Court declines to

2

make

any

Transcripts

further
and

orders

on

the

Administrative

Appointment of Counsel.

Motion

Records

for
and

Preparation
the

Motion

of
for

The Court does note, however, that a

previous Motion for Appointment of Counsel and for Transcript has
been made in this matter and the Court has previously denied
counsel and ordered in the associated matter that the best efforts
of the Clerk be used to obtain transcripts.

Because of the

difficulty in discovering the whereabouts of the former reporter
for this Court, it is likely that said transcripts may in fact be
impossible to obtain.
Based upon all of the foregoing this matter is hereby stayed
xintil such time as the Supreme Court rules on the matter of Pavne

vs- Th? vtaft stgt? Poftrd pf Pfrrflgmsi ?t Alt
In case no. 90*41 Mr. Hickey has moved to withdraw his plea.
It appears that he has, on another occasion, moved for such relief
and that the same was denied by Judge Lyle Anderson.

Certainly at

this point in time the Court should deny the Motion for Withdrawal
of the plea as being untimely and to the extent that the matter has
been ruled upon by another Judge that that decision is res judicata

herein.

'^T&C

DATED t h i s j S d t a y of June, 1996.

3

CERTTFTCATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the fj

day of June, 1996# a -true

and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was Bailed, postage
prepaid, to the following:
Adrian Hickey
c/o Central Utah Correctional Facility
P.O. Box 550
Gunnison, Utah 84634
Gene Strate
Carbon County Attorney
Carbon County Courthouse
120 East Main Street
Price, Utah 84501
Jan Graham
Attorney General
State of Utah
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah
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